Introduction
This article deals with a curious phenomenon in German, a construction in which a negation can be dropped without changing the meaning. Consider the following example:
(1) Peter wollte Potsdam nicht verlassen bevor nicht das Projekt in ruhigem Fahrwasser war. The German example contains a negation after the temporal clausal preposition 2 bevor that appears to be superfluous, given the English translation. Indeed, the example without the negation appears to have the same truth conditions:
(2) Peter wollte Potsdam nicht verlassen bevor das Projekt in ruhigem Fahrwasser war.
There are other well-known examples of non-interpreted negation, viz. cases of so-called negative concord in Slavic and Romance languages, but also in dialects of German and English. But arguably, in those cases the "superfluous" negation has to be present for grammatical reasons, which is not the case here. I will show that the negation is in fact interpreted, and that, due to a complex interplay of semantic and pragmatic factors, we do get truth conditions for the two sentences that are not quite identical, but very similar.
A closer look at "expletive" negation under bevor
It is not by accident that we find a second negation in (1), in the main clause. If we drop that, it is not clear how the negation of the embedded clause should be interpreted at all.
(3) Peter wollte Potsdam verlassen, bevor (# nicht) das Projekt in ruhigem Fahrwasser war.
The constructed example (1) can easily be supplemented by actually occurring data, all of which have a negation in the main clause: In all these examples the negation in the dependent clause appears to be uninterpreted, as the clauses without negation have the same meaning, or are at least truth-conditionally similar:
(
12) Bert kann das Tor nicht passieren, bevor nicht Rolf die Anlage außer Funktion setzt. Bert kann das Tor nicht passieren, bevor Rolf die Anlage außer Funktion setzt.
But the converse test, to put a negation in an arbitrary sentence consisting of a negated main clause and a bevor clause, reveals that the two constructions can convey quite different meanings. This Instances of bis followed by nicht: 19 Searches were carried out for bevor, ehe and bis as subordinating conjunctions ($p=KOUS). There are in fact many more occurrences of "epletive" nicht after bevor, ehe or bis in the corpus. For example, a search of instances of bevor followed by nicht within up to two three words has 205 hits, nearly all of them relevant. Bevor and ehe differ as to text type; ehe occurs most prominently in literary texts, and seems to be in steady decline after the 1950's. There also seems to be a slight decline of bevor with expletive negation (39 hits in the 1910's, 10 hits in the 1990's), 5 This is against claims by Weisgerber (1960) , who states that bevor with expletive negation typically is preposed.
Weisgerber's data are based on a production experiment with students in secondary school. In the DWDS corpus, there are 24 cases with sentence-initial bevor plus "expletive" negation (search string: "Bevor #2 nicht"), and at least 150 cases with non-initial bevor plus "expletive" negation ("bevor #2 nicht").
point was made by Weisgerber (1960) with examples like the following, where a negation in the bevor clause prevents a natural interpretation. Weisgerber's proposal is interesting, but it does not explain why we can drop the "expletive" negation without clear change of truth conditions. This can only be explained if we assume that bevor clauses without negation also can have a conditional meaning. This is indeed the case, as in (15), which expresses that it was a reason for Peter to stay in Potsdam as long as it was necessary to secure that the project is doing well, and under that interpretation the negation after bevor can be dropped without apparent change of truth conditions. The conditional interpretation is often supported by modal elements in the main clause, e.g. in our examples by wollen 'want', können and in der Lage sein 'be able to', dürfen 'be allowed to', die Aussicht haben 'be able to expect'. But this support is not necessary; we have a similar conditional interpretation in (16). 8 The phenomenon has been observed for German before; Weisgerber (1960) refers to older literature; for a more recent descriptive account see the information site of the the IDS Mannheim.
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In the following I will argue that, against first impressions and general opinion, this negation is in fact interpreted. The task, then, is to show how the truth conditions of such sentences arise. In particular, we will have to show how it is possible that a pair of sentences that differ only in the presence or absence of negation can have nearly identical truth conditions.
The meaning of bevor

Bevor as a temporal negation
I assume a meaning of bevor similar to what Anscombe (1964) assumed for before (and what informally was assumed by Weisgerber 1960 as well): The bevor clause is negated for all times at or before the time at which the main clause is evaluated, and the meaning of the main clause and the adverbial clause are combined conjunctively. In the following, n is the time of interpretation, which is picked up by tense operators. We assume that the semantics of past tense locates the event time as prior to the utterance time n, and that tense operators have clausal scope, being operators in I 0 :
n p(t)](λt[Mozart finishes his requiem at t]) = λt[t < n Mozart finishes his requiem at t]
8 Neither van der Wurff nor Mazzon mention any example for expletive negation under before. Thompson & Longacre (1985) mention Mandarin as another language, but with an example that does not contain negation in the main clause. This (and similar cases reported for Lhakota and Turkish) apparently are due to the inherent negation in the word meaning 'before'.
Ta (mei) lai yiqian, women yijing hui jia le.
he NEG arrive before we already return home asp 'Before he arrived, we already had returned home.'
The free tense variable has to be existentially bound. I assume here that this is one of the tasks of the assertion operator. The temporal variable can also be bound by other illocuationary operators, as well as by subordinators like als 'when', wann immer 'whenever' etc. Formally, assertive mood is related to movement of the finite verb to the verb second position (C 0 ), which also entails the requirement to fill the verb-initial position. Applying the assertion operator, which crucially applies only at this stage at not already at the level of the clause Mozart starb, yields the following result (here somewhat simplified):
t[t < n Mozart dies at t ¬ tʹ[tʹ < t Mozart finishes his requiem at tʹ]]
This is what we expect: At the time of Mozart's death t (situated before the speech time) there is no prior time at which Mozart finished his requiem. It follows from our background knowledge that one cannot finish one's requiem after one's death that there is also no later time at which Mozart finished his requiem.
The implicature of likelihood
The current proposal seems insufficient, as we would use (34) only if the bevor clause describes a proposition that is likely at the time of the evaluation of the main clause. For this reason, the following example is odd:
(39) #Mozart starb bevor er ein Oktett für Streicher und Helikopter komponierte. 'Mozart died before he composed an octet for string instruments and helicopters'
To explain this, Heinämäki (1972 ), Ogihara (1995 and Beaver & Condoravdi (2003) have proposed modal accounts of before (which is similar to bevor) which require that non-factual before clauses are interpreted at alternatives of the real world that are likely at the time at which the main clause is evaluated.
But I think going modal is unnecessary. The meaning component in question can be derived from pragmatic principles of informativity: A sentence [A before B] is only informative in contexts where it is considered reasonably probable that B is true some time after the time of interpretation of the main clause. If the common ground carries the information that B is highly unlikely at any time, then the statement that B is not true at any time before a time at which A is true is an unmotivated restriction. More formally: If the a-priori likelihood of t[B(t)] is close to 0, then the a priori likelihood of [A before B] is close to 1, and asserting it would violate the maxim of relevance. Consequently, when uttering a sentence [A before B], the speaker creates the implicature that the a priori probability that t[B(t)] is substantially greater than 0. Grice (1975) . The implicature in question arises from general conversational principles, as follows: The sentence [A bevor B] states that B was not the case before a time t at which A is true. It competes with the stronger statement ¬B, that B never was the case. The usual mechanism for scalar implicatures is set in motion: The hearer can infer that the stronger statement ¬B does not obey the maxim of quality (typically, because it is false), as otherwise the speaker would have made that stronger statement, following the maxim of quantity. This means that typically, the negation of the more general statement ¬ ¬B, which is equivalent to B, is implicated.
The "factual" interpretation of bevor and the concept of reified implicatures
Together with the core meaning of [A bevor B] that B was not the case before a time t at which A is true, it is implicated that B is true at some time after t:
As we do expect from conversational implicatures, this meaning component is partly independent of the lexical items involved, in particular from bevor, as it also occurs with expressions like ehe that have the same truth-conditional meaning. But it arises quite standardly whenever the meaning of bevor / ehe is applied, and hence can be difficult to distinguish from the lexical meaning of these expressions (except, of course, for the fact that it is cancellable). The meaning component is a generalized implicature in the sense of Grice (1975) , or a default implicature in the sense of Levinson (2000) .
For the following discussion I would like to "reify" this implicature as a meaning component of bevor that orginates from general conversational principles but is "folded into" the meaning of a lexical item. It is a "hard-wired" implicature. Being part of the meaning of bevor, it is conventional, but it still can be cancelled; hence it is different from conventional implicatures in the sense of Grice (1975) , and recently discussed in Potts (2005) .
Reified conversational implicatures will be implemented in form of two-dimensional semantic representations ⟨α, β⟩, where α is the core meaning, and β the implicature. This is similar to the treatment of scalar implicatures introduced by number words or Boolean disjunction in Landman (2000) and Chierchia (2004) , who assume that those implicatures are built "in tandem" with truth conditions. The implicature is cancelled if it is contradicted by the core meaning in the context in which it is interpreted. If not cancelled, the overall meaning is the conjunction of α and β.
In the case at hand, the adverbial clause [bevor B] and the proposition expressed by [A bevor B] are interpreted as follows, where I underline the implicature part:
The underlying assumption for the composition of meanings is that the core meaning and the reified implicature are computed in parallel. In particular, if ⟨α, β⟩ is a meaning (with core meaning α and implicature β) that is combined with a meaning γ, the result is a meaning ⟨(γ, α), (γ, β) ⟩, where (γ, α) and (γ, β) stand for the regular meaning combinations (e.g., functional composition or generalized conjunction).
When a proposition with a reified implicature gets asserted, the reified implicature is changed into a regular cancellable implicature, as follows:
If the preceding and following context in which a proposition is interpreted, together with the asserted preposition, does not entail the negation of the implicature, this becomes part of what is asserted; otherwise the implicature is cancelled. The propositional part of example (40) In case it is inconsistent to add the core meaning and the implicature, as when continued with (41) or in the Mozart's requiem example, the implicature part is cancelled.
The treatment of reified conversational implicatures proposed here would certainly have to be substantiated and defended by a consideration of a wider range of cases. One issue that has to be settled is what happens if two meanings with implicatures are combined? Also, we would need a representation that keeps apart the core assertion and what is only implicated. At this point, I will not attempt to go into these details, but turn to the main issue of this article.
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4 Bevor with "expletive" negation: Some attempts at explanation
Expletive negation as negative concord?
We now turn to cases in which bevor occurs with "expletive" negation, and consider a number of options. The first of these options is that expletive negation under bevor is a case of negative concord. This is a well-known phenomenon in a number of languages, where indefinites occur in a special form, as so-called "n(egative)-words", in the scope of a negation. There are various accounts of this phenomenon: n-words have been analyzed as negative polarity items (Laka 1990 , Ladusaw 1992 , as expressions that trigger a negative conventional implicature (Ovalle & Guerzoni 2004), or 10 I would like to mention a possible alternative to the treatment proposed here, the assumption of a lexical ambiguity between a non-factual and a factual bevor, where the latter expresses a conjuction of the core meaning and the implicature. A point in favor of this interpretation is the existence of forms like zehn Minuten bevor 'ten minutes before', which appear to speficy the "<" relation in the implicature tʹ[t < tʹ ⟦B⟧(tʹ)] as < 10min , where t < 10min tʹ iff the last point of t and the first point of tʹ are 10 minutes apart. This would be strange if this meaning component were an implicature. However, constructions like [zehn Minuten bevor B] could also be interpreted with respect to the core meaning, as λt¬ tʹ[tʹ ≤ t ⟦B⟧(tʹ+10min)], where tʹ+10min is the time tʹ extended by 10min at the end of tʹ.
as indefinites that check a negation feature of an expression with higher scope (e.g., Espinal 2000 , Zeijlstra 2004 ).
Negative concord has been invoked by Espinal (2000) In the non-factual reading, albans 'before' requires a subjunctive and triggers n-words. Indefinites have to occur as n-words like ningú, cf. (49), and we can optionally have a negation marker no that is not interpreted, cf. (50). Espinal explains this as a checking of the negative feature of albans, which is restricted to the non-factual reading. This is certainly not the case how negation under bevor in German arises. First, the German case is not restricted to non-factual readings. Second, and more importantly, it nearly always comes with a negation in the main clause, whereas there is no such restriction in Catalan and other Romance languages that show the phenomenon.
But there might be another negative concord analysis for the German data. While Standard German does not obviously show negative concord (in contrast to some dialects, like Bavarian, and historic precursors, like Middle High German), it has been proposed that negative words do not express negation themselves, but indicate the presence of a non-overt negation operator OP NEG , as an agreement or feature-checking operation (cf. Penka & von Stechow 2001 , Zeijlstra 2004 , Penka 2007 . According to this analysis, niemand 'nobody' means the same as jemand 'somebody', but has the syntactic property that it must occur in the socpe of a negation:
We now could make use of the fact that expletive negation under bevor occurs with a negation in the main clause by assuming that this negation has scope over the whole sentence: There are a number of problems with this approach. To start with, as nicht in the bevor clause is not required, one question is: Why is it there at all? Furthermore, notice that it is in an adjunct clause, that is, in a syntactic island. In other dependent clauses NEG is not optional in the same configuration, e.g. in if-clauses. In the following case, the presence of negation makes the predictable semantic difference.
(53) Wir fangen nicht an wenn (nicht) jemand da ist. 'We do not start if someone (noone) is present.'
Furthermore, it would be unclear why, with expletive negation, there is a tendency to avoid nquantifiers in favor of nicht + indefinites. All this makes it unlikely that negation under bevor can be explained as a negative concord phenomenen.
Expletive negation as negative absorption?
Del Prete (2008) analyzes Italian prima 'before' as a comparative expressing comparison relating to the temporal location of events, which are analyzed as degrees on a scale ordered by temporal precedence. Comparatives are interpreted following Seuren (1973) , which in the current case results in the following meaning representation, where I use times instead of Del Prete's events, and disregard tense for simplicity. The last inference follows from the monotonicity properties of degrees.
(54) Gianni arrivò prima che arivasse Lea.
'Gianni arrived before Lea arrived.SUBJ' d[¬[Lea arrived d-early] Gianni arrived d-early]] d[¬ t[Lea arrived at t t is d-early] t[Gianni arrived at t t is d-early]] t[¬ tʹ[Lea arrives at tʹ tʹ≤t] tʹ[Gianni arrives at tʹ tʹ≤t]]
While different from the interpretation of bevor proposed here, Del Prete's interpretation also contains a negation in the prima clause, as in the proposal discussed here.
Del Prete (2008) explains optional "expletive" negation in Italian prima sentences as a result of the negation ¬ that appears in his analysis of the meaning of prima. This negation is said to "absorb" the negation in the clause headed by prima. This is similar as with expletive negation in comparatives in general, which also show expletive negation:
(55) Sparerà più in alto que non pensi. 'He will shoot higher than you NEG think.'
Again, I think that this analysis cannot be applied to negation under bevor clauses in German. Some of the issues of the last section would arise for Del Prete's account as well when applied for German. Furthermore, there is no evidence that German bevor is a comparative, as it does not allow for the comparative complementizer als. And comparatives do not license expletive negation in German to begin with.
Expletive negation as wide-scope "exceptive" negation?
Another attempt is to analyze "expletive" negation as having scope over bevor. The overall interpretation is an exception clause: The main clause makes a general statement, the dependent clause adds an exception. One point in favor of this analysis is that it helps to explain the evidence that negation under bevor is in a syntactically higher position than regular negation. However, exceptive interpretations of clauses typically involve a clear prosodic break between the main clause and the exceptive clause, as indicated by the comma in the second sentence of (56) This prosodic break is lacking with cases of "expletive" negation. The exception clause analysis is also difficult to reconcile with cases like (25) in which a solange clause, an 'as long as' clause, which certainly is not an exception clause, is coordinated with a light negation clause.
4.4
Bevor + "expletive" negation as conditional marker? Weisgerber (1960) proposed that bevor with "expletive" negation has a conditional interpretation. There is still a temporal element in conditonal bevor, as the nature of the condition is a temporal one, which shows up in the use of yet in the paraphrase of the following paraphrase:
(57) Bevor nicht Peter gekommen ist, reisen wir nicht ab. 'For every time t, if Peter has not arrived at t yet, we do not leave at t'
We could express this conditional directly with the conditional maker wenn, except that the following example quantifies over possible situations at a given time, not over possible times:
(58) Wenn Peter noch nicht angekommen ist, reisen wir nicht ab. 'If Peter has not arrived yet, we do not leave.'
Weisgerber's proposal is interesting, but it has a number of explanatory gaps. How precisely are the conditional interpretation of bevor nicht and the temporal interpretation of bevor related to each other? Here, it is relevant that Weisgerber did not pay sufficient attention to the fact that bevor sentences without "expletive" negation can have a conditional interpretation as well. Furthermore, it is not obvious why bevor + "expletive" negation virtually requires a negation in the main clause. This is not the case with other conditionals; for example, the negation in the main clause in (58) can be dropped, with the expected change of meaning.
"Expletive" negation under bevor explained
In this section I will develop a new proposal for "expletive" negation under bevor. Under this proposal it turns out that the negation is in fact interpreted. Let us focus on the following example:
(59) Maria schlief nicht ein bevor nicht Hans zuhause war. 'Maria didn't fall asleep before NEG Hans was home.'
I propose that the negation under the scope of bevor negates a proposition. That is, it yield the complement of the set of times that represents the unnegated proposition:
Applying propositional negation results in the following meaning: The core meaning applies to times t that are not equal or preceded by a time tʹ for which it is not the case that Hans is home at tʹ. This can be rendered more perspicously, applying standard rules of logical equivalence, as a predicate that applies to all times t such that Hans is home at t or at some earlier time:
n Hans is home at tʹ]]
Whenever this applies to a time t, then it holds that Hans is home at all earlier times -in fact, Hans must be home from the beginning of time on! Models for which this is the case are unnatural and can be excluded. Hence we can replace that formula by falsity, . With the implicature, the meaning contribution of the bevor clause then is as follows:
This means that the bevor clause does not apply to any time t but carries the implicature that t is followed by a time tʹ at which Hans is not home. This is a strange meaning indeed that could not specify the time of an ordinary positive sentence. But keep in mind that it will be negated by the negation in the main clause.
I assume that negation in the main clause is assertional, in the sense that it states that there is no time for which the proposition in question is true (which might be relative to a certain reference time interval). Hence assertional negation binds the time argument, leading to a truth value. As a first approximation:
The clause Maria schlief nicht ein is interpreted as follows:
(66) ⟦nicht a ⟧ n (⟦Maria einschlief⟧ n ) = asserted: ¬ t[t < n Maria falls asleep at t] Assertive negation, just like the assertion operator, triggers verb-second (movement of the finite verb to C 0 ), which itself triggers movement of one constituent to sentence-initial position (Spec-CP). This results in the following structure (I assume that the verb einschlaf-, with a separable prefix ein-, moves from V 0 to I 0 , where it receives agreement features and from where the verb stem moves to C 0 ): In case assertional negation applies to a two-dimensional meaning consisting of a core meaning and a reified implicature, the most plausible assumption is that both the meaning proper and the implicature is negated (compare with the rule for ASSERT in (46)):
Let us consider what happens if a simple bevor sentence is negatively asserted: = asserted: ¬ t[t < n Maria falls asleep at t ¬ t′[t′ ≤ t t′ < n Hans is home at t′]] implicated: ¬ t[t < n Maria falls asleep at t t′[t < t′ t′ < n Hans is home at t′]]
The assertion part of (70) can be simplified as follows, using standard rules of predicate logic:
t[t < n Maria falls asleep at t → t′[t′ ≤ t Hans is home at t′]]
This states that for every time t at which Maria fell asleep there is a prior time t′ at which Hans was home (and as being home is understood as coming home and staying home, Hans was home at the time at which Maria fell asleep). This is the right interpretation if we rule out quantification over a non-empty domain. Notice that in contrast to a positive assertion, the negative assertion has a conditional flavor: it expresses a condition for the time at which Mary fell asleep. This captures the subtle difference between (70) and a sentence using nachdem 'after':
(72) Maria schlief ein nachdem Hans zuhause war.
t[t < n Maria fell asleep at t t′[t′ < t t′ < n Hans is home at t′]]
What about the implicature part of (70)? It states that there is no time t such that Maria fell asleep at t that was followed by a time t′ at which Hans was home. This contradicts the meaning part if we assume, as a natural interpretation, that Hans stayed home once he came home. Hence the implicature part is cancelled.
We now turn to the case in which the bevor clause contains a propositional negation, our core example (59):
n Maria falls asleep at t ], = implicated: ¬ t[t < n Maria falls asleep at t tʹ[t < tʹ ¬[t′ < n Hans is home at tʹ]]
The core meaning reduces to truth, as λt[Maria falls asleep at t ] = λt[ ], and ¬ t[ ] = . This means that the core meaning is always satisfied; it is a tautology. The only meaning contri bution is due to the implicature, which states that there is no t at which Maria fell asleep that is followed by a time at which Hans was not home.
This turns out to capture the truth conditions, as the diagram (74) The diagram illustrates that the bevor clause excludes that the main clause is true during and up to the time at which Hans is home. To be precise: It excludes that the main clause is true right before the time at which Hans is home, a time that is still followed by a time at which Hans is not home yet. This rather fine point can be best illustrated in a model with discrete time:
(75) Diagram showing the difference between bevor Hans zuhause ist and bevor Hans nicht zuhause ist, in a model of discrete time.
The two meanings could also be distinguished in a model with truth value gaps. If we assume that at the time when Hans comes home it is neither the case that Hans is not home, nor that Hans is home, then bevor nicht Hans zuhause ist would exclude the arrival time, wheres bevor Hans zuhause ist would include it.
I would like to point out that it is crucial for this derivation that we assumed a "tandem" interpretation of the two meaning components of bevor clauses, and not just a conjunction. A conjunctive interpretation would yied the following result (disregarding past tense): We also can explain why negation under before appears to be "expletive" -that is, why we can drop it without obvious change of meaning. The assertion part of (70), which is the only relevant meaning as the implicature is cancelled, is similar in meaning to the implicature part of (74), which is the only relevant meaning as the core meaning is a tautology. The truth conditions of these two readings are extremely similar, even though the ways by which we arrive at them are quite different. For this reason, both the version with "expletive" negation and the one without can be considered equally complex, and hence the version without negation cannot block the one with negation. (75)). This is a vanishingly small difference, especially in a model with a dense structure of time.
The obligatoriness of negation, and the conditional interpretation
Negation in the main clause is crucial for expletive negation under bevor. Without it, we get a clause that is necessarily false, due to the falsity in the second conjunct of the core meaning: Again, the core meaning is a tautology, for all plausble models, and all the information is carried by the implicature part. It states that for all times t that are followed by a time at which the child (still) cannot sit up, the child feels most comfortable lying down. This is the right interpretation. The assertion of (81) is the conjuction of both the core meaning and the implicature, which is equivalent to the implicature. We see that the occurrence in the restrictor of a universal quantifier leads to a situation in which the core meaning of the bevor clause is "neutralized", and only the implicature part survives.
Of course, bevor clauses as restrictors of conditionals need not contain a negation. The following statement has (nearly) the same truth conditions, as predicted by our formalization: Now the implicature reduces to tautology, for all plausible models: If we assume that the child learns to sit up at some time (and never looses this ability), then the set of times t that precede a time at which the child can sit up is the set of all times. With this, the representation of (82) on a single sunrise at a time t 0 , the core meaning and the implicature state something much too strong -that the bell must ring at all times before t 0 . One way to avoid this is to assume that bevor clauses specify stretches of times. For example, bevor Peter ging 'before Peter left' specifies the stretch of time from the beginning up to the point where Peter left. The main clause is then said to be true at some part of this time, making the bevor clause effectively a way to identify, or restrict, the reference time in the sense of Klein (1994) . Quantification over bevor clauses then would be quantification over sets of such maximal times, e.g. in the case of , quantification over all maximal times before each sunrise. Still, a number of things would have to be worked out, like guaranteeing that each sunrise is associated with its own bell ring (cf. de Swart 1991), guaranteeing that the bell ring is temporally close to its sunrise, and taking care of cases which allow for simultaneous event times, as in Before a man is buried, a bell rings. The solution to these problems will have to wait for another occasion.
As stated in the introductory section, it has been observed that the two types of negation differ in their syntactic behavior (cf. Weisgerber 1960 , Weiß 2002 , Schwarz & Bhatt 2006 Given that there are these two kinds of negations, an obvious question is why they differ in their syntactic behaviour in this way. In particular, if regular negation indeed is assocated with an illocutionary function, and even if it just existentially closes the time variable, we would expect it to reside higher in the syntactic tree than propositional negation, which needs a semantic representation with a disclosed time variable. A plausible reason for this behavior of regular negation is the following: If it is indeed related to illocutionary force, then it should be sensitive to the current common ground. In particular, it should indicate the givenness status of constituents, and this is exactly what its placement indicates, as given constituents have to scramble left of it, and non-given indefinites in its scope are marked by kein-forms. In contrast, the need to mark givenness is relaxed for propositional negation, as it does not relate the proposition to the common ground (see also Klein 2007 for a slightly different motivation for the syntactic position of negation).
There are other kinds of negations that are not propositional, but assertive in nature -in particular, the clausal negation es ist nicht der Fall, dass... 'it is not the case that...', and rejecting or denying negation, as marked by keineswegs. Due to their assertive nature, they cannot be used as "expletive" negation under bevor either:
(91) *Maria schlief nicht ein bevor keineswegs Hans zuhause war.
However, if these negations are assertive, why can they not serve as negations in the upstairs clause either (cf. (23) and (24))? These negations presuppose that a similar sentence without the negation was uttered or can be inferred from the conversational situation, and they are used to deny that target sentence. This makes them not suitable for our case, as their target sentence would be ungrammatical.
In concluding, I would like to turn to the question why modern English does not exhibit "expletive" negation under before. I woud like to propose that this is related to the fact that English expresses negation by a separate head (the inflected form do + n't), whereas German expresses negation primarily with a modifier (nicht). Under this assumption the English expression, being a head, is necessarily tied to assertion, different from the German modifier negation. Hence, English does not have "expletive" negation under before because it does not have a propositional negation expressing the meaning λpλt¬p(t), but only an assertive negation, λp¬ t[p(t)]. It is perhaps more than a happy coincidence that expletive negation disappears in English in the 15 th century (van der Wurff 1999); this is just around the time when do-support arises.
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